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Abstract
Australia's bushfire seasons are 
expected to become longer and 
more severe due to the effects of 
climate change and an increasing 
population living in rural-urban 
fringes. Social and economic 
vulnerability to extreme natural 
hazards means that Australia’s 
emergency services sector plays 
a significant role in community 
safety and wellbeing. Therefore, 
it is important that the sector 
continually improves. Australia 
has a long history of conducting 
external reviews into significant 
bushfires. While these reviews 
receive good support and seek to 
identify relevant lessons, barriers 
remain that prevent these lessons 
from being effectively learnt. It is 
possible that some of these barriers 
exist because the stratum of work 
impedes the capture, codifying 
and adjustments to systems. 
This research investigated the 
premise that lessons learnt in the 
Australian emergency services 
sector occurs on a stratum, with 
different types of lessons learnt 
at different levels of work. Four 
significant independent bushfire 
reviews were analysed to evaluate 
whether specific lessons could 
be aligned to the stratum of 
work. Findings were that not 
all lessons apply to all levels of 
organisations. This supports the 
premise that lessons are learnt on 
a vertical organisational stratum; 
for example, some lessons were 
operational, others were tactical 
and some were strategic. It 
was determined that a lack of 
understanding of the barriers 
within an organisations stratum 
could impede the effectiveness of 
lessons being learnt.
The efficacy of aligning 
lessons learnt from 
significant bushfire 
incidents to the 
organisational stratum
Introduction
Australia’s bushfire seasons are lasting longer and getting 
more severe. More Australians are living in rural-urban fringe 
areas and Australia’s climate has changed with increasing 
temperatures (CSIRO & Bureau of Meteorology 2018). These 
circumstances present challenges for the emergency services 
sector, which includes multiple organisations (each with 
several organisational strata) operating in a high stress, high-
consequence environment. The emergency services sector 
needs to be continually improving, which requires effective 
lessons learnt processes to prevent, prepare, respond to and 
recover from bushfires.
External inquiries are conducted after significant disasters, 
especially bushfires (Dufty 2013; Owen et al. 2018). 
According to Eburn and Dovers (2015, p.501) ‘between 
1939 and 2010 Royal Commissions and other inquiries have 
produced 953 recommendations as lessons to reduce the 
risk of bushfire’. Such reviews are conducted by experts, 
have clear terms of reference and state the methodology, 
which includes consultation with experts and/or affected 
community members. For example, both the Margaret 
River bushfire review (Keelty 2012) and the Bega Valley Fires 
Independent Review (Keelty 2018) were authored by Michael 
Joseph Keelty AO APM, a former Commissioner of the 
Australian Federal Police. Other reviews, such as the review 
into the 2009 Victorian bushfires (Teague, McLeod & Pascoe 
2010), are conducted as royal commissions, which carries 
significant weight (Australian Law Reform Commission 2010).
Nevertheless, questions arise regarding whether the 
recommendations identified in reviews are actually 
converted to lessons, or even learnt by the emergency 
services sector and the Australian community (Dufty 2013, 
Owen et al. 2018) and integrated into capability. Reasons 
for such criticism include limited follow-up after the event 
and whether lessons can be transferred between events 
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conducting external reviews (Cole et al. 2018, Dufty 2013, Owen 
et al. 2018) and variances exist in codifying and communicating 
lessons learnt.
Noting the literature limitations, this study considered the 
research question: ‘Do the lessons identified in prior significant 
incidents support the proposition that lessons are learnt at 
different stratum of the organisation?’
Learning in the emergency services 
sector
There is an extensive body of knowledge about emergency 
services, emergency management and disaster management 
(Howes et al. 2015; Owen et al. 2018; Whitmer, LaGoy & Sims 
2018; Glassey 2015). This literature covers the 4 stages of the 
emergency management cycle being prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery. There is a significant emphasis on future 
risk factors such as the effects of climate change (McAneney, 
Chen & Pitman 2009; McCaw 2013; Winkworth et al. 2009). 
A subset of the literature focuses on significant Australian 
bushfires, especially the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires and the 
2009 Victorian bushfires (Cameron et al. 2009, Leonard & Howitt 
2010, Valent 1984).
How organisations learn
Organisations adapt and learn and this results in tangible and 
intangible benefits (Deverell 2009 Duffield & Whitty 2015, 
Rowe & Sikes 2006). However, the structure of an organisation 
can affect its ability to learn (Aubry & Lavoie-Tremblay 2018). 
This supports the work of Garvin, Edmondson and Gino (2008), 
who argue that concrete learning processes and leadership 
that reinforces learning are important factors in establishing a 
learning organisation. This is particularly relevant for emergency 
services organisations that are ‘traditionally hierarchical in nature 
and tend to value their own command and control arrangements’ 
(Owen et al. 2018, p.716). For example, Boin and t'Hart (2010) 
argue that there are different challenges at the operational and 
strategic level in emergency services organisations.
Gaps in emergency services learning
There is a large body of knowledge about identifying and learning 
lessons, also known as lessons management, in emergency 
management (Cole et al. 2018, Jackson 2016, Stuart & Thomason 
2018, Donahue & Tuohy 2006). A review of this work showed 
some dissent in organisational learning literature regarding the 
use of the terms ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘lessons management’. 
However, the definition differences of these terms are outside 
the scope of this paper. Within the Australian context, a seminal 
text is the Lessons Management Handbook (Australian Institute 
for Disaster Resilience 2019), which includes a 4-step cycle for 




 · monitoring and review.
As Owen and co-authors (2018) argue, this body of knowledge is 
growing, stating that:
a search of one database, for example (Proquest) revealed 
that of the 266 publications identified using the search 
terms learning lessons and emergency management 50 per 
cent of them had been published in the past five years.
(Owen et al. 2018, p.716).
Cole and co-authors (2018, p.34) conducted a meta-analysis of 
‘1,336 recommendations made in 55 Australian major post-
event reviews and inquiries since 2009’. Although this research 
identified common themes across the post-event reviews, 
these themes were not aligned to specific organisational strata 
and failed to consider Boin and t'Hart's (2010) views about the 
challenges for learning lessons at different levels in emergency 
services organisations. This limitation indicates that a gap in the 
literature exists. Although literature about Stratified Systems 
Theory, organisational learning and learning in the emergency 
services sector already exists, to date, these have not been fused 
to investigate the lessons-learnt process in different strata in 
emergency services organisations. 
Underlying theory
The idea of different strata existing within an organisation 
containing different roles, responsibilities and outlook based 
on task abstraction can be traced back to the work of Jaques 
(1996, 2016). Stratified Systems Theory states that organisations 
have multiple levels, or strata, based on the time span of control 
(Table 1). Time span of control is a measurement of ‘the target 
completion time of the longest task, project, or program assigned 
to that role’ (Jaques 1990). Jaques (1996) identified 7 strata 
within an organisation:
 · front-line
 · first-line manager
 · unit manager
 · general manager
 · business unit president
 · vice president
 · chief executive officer. 
Stratified Systems Theory is a robust means of evaluating 
organisations and allows for comparisons between different 
organisations (Craddock 2009). Therefore, this theory has 
direct relevance to the lessons-learnt process in the emergency 
services sector as disasters usually involve a multi-agency 
response. For example, Jaques (2016) highlights how each 
organisation’s stratum aligns with other orgaisation’s strata; 
where indiviuals from one stratum may have responsibility for 
the activities of members of another organisational stratum, but 
with no line management authority. 
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Table 1. Occupational stratum of work in organisations (Jaques 
1996, 2002).
Stratum
Time span of 
discretion
Role complexity Role

















3 1 to 2 years Task extrapolation Unit 
Manager
2 3 months to 1 
year
Task definition First-line 
Manager
1 1 day to 3 
months
Concrete shaping Front-line 
workers
Methodology
This study applied a 2-stage design that, while acknowledging the 
theoretical framing of Jaques’s work, compressed the stratum of 
work to 3 levels. Using this revised stratum, significant bushfire 
events in Australia were thematically analysed.
Stage 1: Compressing Jaques’s stratum of work
Jaques (1996) Stratified Systems Theory can be used to classify 
organisational positions into 7 different strata. However, it is 
difficult to consistently apply the full Stratified Systems Theory 
model to every organisation as the reviews focused on the 
bushfire incident rather than on the organisations. Therefore, the 
Stratified Systems Theory needed to be compressed into 3 levels 
that were grouped based on alignment to the generally used 
strata designations of operational (front-line), tactical (middle 
managers) and strategic (executives).
Stage 2: Content and thematic analysis
The most appropriate method for addressing the research 
questions involved purposeful sampling and thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke 2006). As a methodological process, purposeful 
sampling involves selecting participants, or relevant documents, 
‘directly related to the central phenomenon or key concept being 
explored in a study’ (Creswell & Plano Clark 2018, p.176). For this 
study, purposive sampling enabled the selection of information-
rich cases that represent the complex elements of lessons learnt 
from bushfire emergencies, and specifically, investigating the link 
between lessons and the stratum of work.
Analysis
This study investigated lessons identified within the bushfire-
threat environment across 4 external reviews of significant 
bushfires that occurred in Australia between 1983 and 2018. The 
study followed the iterative thematic analysis process outlined 
by Braun and Clarke (2006). This method involved reviewing the 
data, generating a code list and undertaking multiple rounds of 
searching, extracting and reviewing themes. Selecting external 
post-event reviews that were conducted by experts and included 
a methodology section provided validity to the study as it 
indicates that the data is credible (Leung 2015). The iterative 
thematic analysis process and using multiple sources to extract 
themes (triangulation process) also added to the reliability and 
validity of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark 2018).
Stage 1: Compressing Jaques’s stratum of work
The Stratified Systems Theory was compressed to 3 levels of 
operational, middle management and executive as detailed in 
Table 2.






7 to 8 3. Strategic 
executive
Strategic decision-makers (i.e. 
senior leaders and government 
ministers, develops policies, 
allocates agency resources).
4 to 6 2. Tactical 
middle 
management
Operational decision-makers (i.e. 
team/section leaders, implement 
policy, allocates tactical/daily 
resources).
1 to 3 1. Operational Tactical-level decision-makers 
(i.e. first responders, direct 
interaction with the public).
 
Stage 2: Thematic analysis
Table 3 presents the inclusion criteria for the published documents 
of post-event reviews of Australian bushfires (Benoot et al. 2016, 
Eburn & Dovers 2015).
Table 3: Inclusion criteria.
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Using this process, 4 reviews of significant bushfire incidents 
were selected:
 · 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfire review (Miller, Carter & 
Stephens 1984)
 · 2009 Victorian bushfire review (Teague et al. 2010)
 · 2011 Margaret River bushfire review (Keelty 2012)
 · 2018 Bega Valley bushfire review (Keelty 2018).
The 4 reviewed documents totalled 399 pages, which were coded 
for analysis. A code list was developed and refined throughout an 
iterative coding process so that analysis of each document was 
consistent. Each code related to a specific type of lesson. Lessons 
were defined as a specific finding and/or recommendation that 
can be actioned in the future (either to repeat in the future 
or change in the future). As each lesson was extracted, it was 
mapped against the established compressed stratum of work.
1983 Ash Wednesday bushfire review
On 16 February 1983, 180 bushfires were burning across Victoria. 
These fires had a catastrophic impact on the communities 
affected with 47 people killed, 2080 homes damaged or 
destroyed and approximately 200,000 hectares burnt (Miller et 
al. 1984, p.23). The subsequent review covered all phases of the 
emergency management cycle. Although the review did not use 
the specific terminology of ‘organisational strata’, there were 
statements about the importance of senior and experienced 
officers helping junior officers and how decisions were delegated 
from the state-level Country Fire Authority to regional (local) 
levels. Another key lesson, which primarily aligns to the executive 
and operational strata, was that legislation, policies and 
procedures should be enhanced to prepare, prevent and respond 
to bushfire hazards and to recovery from bushfire incidents. For 
example, the review stated that ‘suitable legislation would enable 
the State Government to declare a “State of Emergency” or 
“State of Disaster”…’ (Miller et al. 1984, p.63).
The review added that the Country Fire Authority and Forests 
Commission Victoria should not be merged into one organisation 
and should not adopt a common communications system. 
Instead, the focus should be increased liaison and coordination. 
The review’s emphasis on communication and coordination 
included agencies that are not primarily focused on disaster 
situations and members of the public. Although these lessons 
are largely aligned to the executive strata (those responsible 
for establishing and shaping organisational culture), there are 
relevant lessons for the middle management and operational 
strata that conduct the liaison activities.
2009 Victorian bushfire review
On 7 February 2009 (Black Saturday), over 300 bushfires 
burned in Victoria. 173 people died and an estimated $4 billion 
in damage occurred (Teague et al. 2010). Unlike the other 
reviews, the review into these fires was established as a Royal 
Commission. Although the commission’s final report referred to 
other inquiries, including the 1998 Linton Inquiry that reviewed 
incidents relating to the death of 5 firefighters, the report did not 
reference the 1983 Ash Wednesday review that related to the 
same geographic area.
The review included the 4 phases of the emergency management 
cycle. The report did not use the specific terminology of 
‘organisational strata’ but did consider organisational-level 
change and had specific recommendations for senior executives. 
For example, the review recommended appointing a full-time fire 
commissioner, increasing prescribed burning and that ‘Victoria’s 
ageing electricity infrastructure requires updating’ (Teague et 
al. 2010, p.12). There were lessons identified that related to 
information flow and information management. This information 
lessons included having more nuanced bushfire warnings and 
more specific information to operational firefighters. The lesson 
about the nuanced bushfire warning can be aligned to the middle 
management strata that prepares the community education 
programs and the operational strata that provides advice to the 
public.
2011 Margaret River bushfire review
The 2011 Margaret River bushfires in Western Australia started 
when 2 prescribed burns became uncontrolled. They resulted 
in 139 people being displaced; 32 homes, 9 chalets and 4 sheds 
being destroyed and 3400 hectares burnt (Keelty 2012). The 
primary focus of the review was to analyse how the Western 
Australia Department of Environment and Conservation planned 
and managed the 2 prescribed burns. The review did not 
specifically refer to different strata within the department but 
did use terms such as ‘middle management’. 
The review covered 3 phases of the emergency management 
cycle: prevention, preparedness and response. The review 
referred to other reviews including the 2010 Ferguson Review 
(Ferguson 2010), which focused on the department’s ability to 
manage fires and a Western Australia Supreme Court decision 
about prescribed burning. A key lesson in the review was 
that managing the risks of prescribed burns, especially in the 
rural-urban fringe, is complicated because not conducting 
prescribed burns can lead to catastrophic situations if a bushfire 
occurs. Although aspects of these lessons can be aligned to the 
operational strata, which includes the individuals and teams who 
conduct prescribed burns, the middle management stratum was 
specifically mentioned. There are also lessons that can be aligned 
to the executive strata that is responsible for setting the risk 
assessment process, which was considered by the review to be 
out-of-date and inconsistently applied.
2018 Bega Valley bushfire review
On 18 March 2018, multiple bushfires destroyed 65 homes, 70 
caravans and cabins and 1250 hectares in the Bega Valley in New 
South Wales. The review focused on one phase of the emergency 
management cycle: response. The review assessed the 
relationship between Fire and Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW) 
and the Rural Fire Service (RFS). For example, the review stated 
there was cooperation at the operational and executive strata 
but ‘the weight of submissions painted a picture of animosity 
and mistrust between FRNSW and the RFS in many districts and 
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at the middle management level’ (Keelty 2018, p.18). The review 
also highlighted that call-and-dispatch arrangements between 
a 000 caller, RFS and the RFS were flawed and in need of urgent 
reform. Aspects of this lesson are aligned to the executive 
strata (by prioritising and funding resources for improving the 
system) and the middle management strata (by implementing the 
recommendations to improve the system).
Extracting themes
Once the full set of lessons were extracted, they were grouped 
into themes (Table 4). A theme included extracted lessons that 
were identified in 3 or more reviews. These themes included 
the need to update legislation, procedures and documents so 
that the emergency services organisations can adapt to different 
bushfire conditions, environments and circumstances. There was 
also emphasis on control and coordination within and between 
emergency services organisations. This control and coordination 
included role clarification and improving community education 
and bushfire warnings processes. Several of the themes are 
directly relevant to the national themes detailed in the Lessons 
Management Handbook (Australian Institute for Disaster 
Resilience 2019). Each theme was then mapped against the 
relevant emergency management phase and the relevant 
(indicative) strata (Table 5).
Table 4: Extracted themes. 
Lesson category Specific lesson











Relevant fire factor Weather conditions  yes  yes  yes no




Legislation and/or policies are out-of-date 
and/or difficult to implement
 yes  yes  yes  yes
Increase the number of prescribed burns  yes  yes  yes no
Change building codes, planning and/or zoning 
to reflect bushfire risk 
 yes  yes  yes no
Update documents (i.e. disaster plans and 
incident action plans)
 yes  yes  yes no
Problems shifting between non-disaster and 
disaster roles
 yes  yes  yes no
Inconsistent processes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Coordination Liaison between agencies needs to improve  yes  yes  yes  yes
Need for role clarification  yes  yes no  yes
Communication Warnings/information system needs to 
improve




Importance of volunteers and local knowledge  yes  yes  yes  yes
Communications and/or IT equipment  yes  yes no  yes
Future threat Future threat from bushfires  yes  yes  yes  yes
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Table 5: Sample of extracted themes mapping against the emergency management phase and indicative strata.






Prevention Executive: Responsible for updating legislation, procedures and 
the overarching suite of documents; sets priorities and policies for 
prescribed burns; setting organisational culture (ongoing emphasis 
on officer safety).
Middle management: Responsible for the operational risks 
for each prescribed burn; applying rating/prioritisation system 
consistently; allocating resources








Executive: Prioritise standardising IT systems; fund updated IT and 
communication systems.
Middle management: Standardise (as much as possible) briefing 
processes and information flows to/from the tactical teams; 
regional level middle management to develop region-specific 
advice for the public.
Operational: Provide specific advice to community groups using 
different formats/platforms.
Coordination Liaison between 





Executive: Responsible for establishing an organisational culture 
that focuses on liaison; creating and enforcing standards.
Middle management: Responsible for liaison at the middle 
management level and ensuring operational-level liaison occurs; 
role clarification at team level.









Middle management: Problems in communication and information 
sharing between the government agency and volunteer brigades.
Do emergency services lessons occur 
across the stratum?
Findings from this research supported the proposition made 
in the research question by finding that lessons learnt can 
be aligned to specific organisational strata. Findings can be 
supported through the need for specific stratum learning in 
legislation, communications, coordination and resourcing. For 
example, the 2009 Victorian bushfire review recommended:
…the Country Fire Authority and the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment standardise their operating 
systems and information and communications technologies 
with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and 
interoperability between agencies. 
(Teague et al. 2010, p.28). 
This study also found that at the executive strata there is 
a responsibility to establish an organisational culture that 
focuses on intra- and inter-departmental liaison. Whereas, at 
the middle management strata, the indicative focus is towards 
standardising processes. Finally, at the operational strata, 
liaison needs to be enabled and supported. Further research 
could consider whether there are specific barriers at different 
operational strata that impede the lessons-learnt process in 
emergency services organisations. Improving lessons-learnt 
processes could have flow-on implications for communities 
through better responses to emergency incidents and for 
government through improved use of resources. 
Limitations
A limitation of this study was the difficulty in comparing the 
selected incidents using only the external reviews as sources. 
The reviews ranged in scale, with the 1983 and 2009 reviews 
focusing on all 4 phases of the emergency management cycle, 
while the other 2 reviews were narrower in scope. Apart from 
the 2 Victorian incidents, the other incidents occurred in 
different Australian states and involved different jurisdictions 
and different emergency services organisations. Therefore, it 
was difficult to assess whether a 2011 review into prescribed 
bushfires getting out of control in Western Australia should have 
learnt from a 1983 review into bushfires in Victoria.
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Conclusion
This study supported the proposition that emergency services 
organisations need to continually improve and that some 
learning between significant bushfire incidents occurs. However, 
reviews undertaken following significant bushfire events still 
indicate that further work is required. Furthermore, that lessons 
learnt are implicitly aligned towards specific stratum. Therefore, 
to assist the lessons-learnt process would be to align lessons to 
specific organisational strata, as this provides clearer advice to 
the organisations about who should be responsible for learning 
from each identified lesson.
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